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1. Introduction: The problem of multiple experts in a pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic introduces new issues and questions into political economy
regarding public health, public goods, and public choice. To introduce them, this paper
first reviews Roger Koppl’s provocative expert paradox, and asks how should we look upon
the role of expert opinion in the special circumstances when an epidemic becomes a
society-wide pandemic. It then characterizes pandemics in social behavioral terms as
contagions, and defines a contagion as a two-level, two-direction, reflexive feedback loop
system operating between individual and collective beliefs. On this model, experts can
acquire a special status. If they become especially influential regarding aggregate opinion,
their recommendations can act as self-fulfilling prophecies that change collective beliefs
and behavior in ways that can worsen rather than ameliorate a pandemic.
This problem is compounded by another. Experts, including public health experts, are
thought to generate public goods by creating knowledge that can be widely shared. This
understanding derives from economics’ standard taxonomy of goods which defines public
goods as generally non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Public goods are contrasted with
private goods, and debates often focus on market vs. government failure. Suppose,
however, that expertise is contested, and different sets of experts disagree. Depending on
institutional settings, experts’ opinions have different impacts. Then competition between
experts can create competing public goods if different groups of people rely on different
experts. In a pandemic, seen as a society-wide contagion phenomenon, this can then lead
to competing self-fulfilling prophecies as different expert visions become embedded in
different groups of people, and people’s behaviors divide along different expert lines.
Koppl’s expert paradox is then accentuated, and expertise can become a curse rather than
social benefit.
James Buchanan argued that a society could produce competing public-like goods in his
analysis of club goods – now also known as local public goods. Whereas public goods in
the standard sense are generally non-excludable and non-rivalrous, club goods/local public
goods are excludable and non-rivalrous only for different groups of people. This means
that a kind of public good provision can be achieved whereby different social groups
provide public-like goods to themselves to the exclusion of other social groups.
But which such goods should different groups provide themselves? Groups’ own experts
then provide guidance using the standard public goods meaning of non-excludable and
non-rivalrous, which effectively applies to individual groups once society is redefined as
the relevant social group. The existence of other social groups and other experts then
becomes effectively irrelevant. Nonetheless, a contagion process as in the case of a
pandemic works across social groups so any one group’s adopted behaviors have effects on
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other social groups. Expertise and its uptake may be segregated by social group but a
contagion by nature travels across social groups.
What is the solution to this enlarged expertise problem? I argue that it calls for attending
to the nature of public choice. Drawing on recent constitutional political economy
reasoning and discourse analysis, the paper argues that a society’s ability to address
pandemics such as COVID-19 depends on whether its public reasoning processes can be
constructed in such a way as to be ‘inclusive and noncoercive.’ Then, how a society combats
COVID-19 and pandemics fundamentally depends upon the normative issues associated
with the practical rules and institutional arrangements that free democratic societies adopt
to survive social and economic shocks that history regularly produces.
Section 2 reviews Koppl’s paradox. Section 3 models contagions as a two-level, twodirection reflexive social process. Section 4 describes how self-fulfilling prophecies work,
and applies this to Koppl’s expert failure problem. Section 5 reviews economics’ goods
taxonomy, discusses Buchanan’s club goods/local public goods category, and contrasts it
with its opposite, common pool goods, studied by Elinor Ostrom. Section 6 returns to
COVID-19, develops a simple model of two pairs of possible responses to experts according
to whether people occupy club/local public good or common pool type social economic
circumstances, and argues that taken together these two sets of responses to experts can
work to spread a disease rather than reduce it. Section 7 shifts to a public choice and
constitutional political economy perspective, and, using a discourse approach to ethics and
politics associated with Jürgen Habermas’ thinking, argues that the two main ‘success
conditions’ for a public deliberative process to be just and legitimate are that it be seen as
inclusive and noncoercive. Section 8 returns to Koppl’s expert problem, and comments
briefly on the normative scope of expertise as applies to public health.

2. Koppl’s paradox
Koppl’s expert paradox reflects the nature of knowledge and society in a world in which
there exists a high division of labor (Koppl, 2018). When in this world knowledge becomes
specialized on some subject, only some individuals master it and speak with authority upon
it. The responsibility that accompanies their knowledge, when it functions as a public
good, is to use it for the advantage of the general public, but there is always a risk is that
experts will use that knowledge to promote their individual advantage or private views. In
many circumstances, this may not have serious consequences. Competition between
experts may net out these effects without having serious spillover consequences for society.
Societies also institutionalize various evaluation mechanisms and practices to assess expert
opinion (Boumans, 2015). Yet even then there is no guarantee that expert knowledge will
work to the advantage of the general public.
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Consider the pandemic and public health expertise. Experts possess specialized knowledge
regarding disease transmission and public health measures needed to control it. Yet,
specialized knowledge is not uniform across experts, and experts often disagree regarding
how differences between them should be judged. How debate and disagreement across
experts works out, then, does not necessarily assure us that the best opinions are adopted
– as hindsight and the history of science has often shown. This is not mean that expertise
should be ignored or that expert knowledge in the case of the current pandemic has been
mistaken or misguided. Rather Koppl’s puzzle should alert us to the fact that when society
most needs experts to manage their relatively unique knowledge in the general interest,
there is no ‘royal road’ for doing so. Experts are fallible, and can end up recommending
measures that turn out to have been mistaken despite their best intentions. Thus, Koppl
tells us, our dilemma is that we ought to “value expertise” but we also need to “fear expert
power” (Koppl, 2018, 237).
Koppl frames his paradox in terms of personal virtues and vices. Experts can and often
exercise humility regarding their special positions. The proper source of that humility lies
in the expert knowing that specialized knowledge is by nature narrow in scope and thus
limited in how much it tells us about the world. Following Friedrich Hayek (1937, 1945),
knowledge in societies with developed divisions of labor is highly distributed and
decentralized, and this should act as a caution on experts regarding it misuse. I argue, then,
that Koppl’s worry takes on special added weight when a society is affected by events whose
proportions are systemic, such as the current pandemic. Then expert failure may not be
only local in its effects but also do serious damage to the general public. In the next section
I model events of this scale and nature as a particular type of social process, and apply this
analysis to the idea of a contagion.

3. Contagions as a two-level, two-direction reflexive social process
Contagions are a well-known phenomenon that afflict societies not only in the domain of
public health but also in such domains as culture and politics. In the case of the last, think
of the crowds and massive adulation that greeted Adolph Hitler in June 1940 on his arrival
at Anhalter train station in Berlin after the fall of Paris. Think of the great crowds of adults
and children who attended public celebrations of torture and lynching of African
Americans in the U.S. Jim Crow period, proudly sending pictures and postcards of these
killings to their friends. The scale and horror of these sorts of events tells us that social
interaction can take on proportions that exceed and transcend interactions between people
that occur largely at the individual level. They occur at crowd levels, and what occurs there
feeds back upon and transforms interaction between people at the individual level.
Consider, then, how a pandemic operates as one type of a contagion.
A pandemic has been defined as “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide
area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people”
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(Last, 2001). What thus characterizes a pandemic as a type of contagion is how a disease
spreads across large numbers of people through their individual contact and interaction
with one another. This spreading, or a disease’s transmission across people, proceeds not
only on a one-by-one basis but repeatedly across multiple groups of people and through
the mechanism of their one-by-one interaction. We can accordingly say that a pandemic
as a contagion phenomenon is a special or perhaps exceptional form of one-by-one
interaction that may act upon and transform how that interaction occurs. A contagion is
a transmission of something – a disease, a taste, norms, habits, a practice, political values,
etc. – which has social effects over and above its person-level manifestation in virtue of how
it travels across people through their contact and interaction.
This sort of two-direction, two-level feedback loop system was modeled by Herbert Simon
in his general but simple characterization of a complex system, where “a complex system
... [is] one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way (Simon,
1962, 468).1 When described sequentially, such a system follows these steps:
-

people’s one-by-one interaction ‘feeds forward’ to affect their shared circumstances,
changes in their shared circumstances feed backward upon and affect their individual
circumstances,
changes in their individual circumstances then alter their one-by-one interaction
this again ‘feeds forward’ to affect the nature of their shared circumstances,
this process repeats itself until or unless something brings it to a halt.

The two levels are the one-by-one interaction and people’s shared circumstances. The two
directions are how the former feeds forward upon the latter, and then the latter feeds
backward upon the former. The reason for calling this a single system is that the feed
forward/feed backward actions are connected in such a way as to link the two levels in a
recurring loop of mutual effects – as economists would say, endogenizing them to one
another. The system is complex in that multiple factors on different levels operate upon
one another at the same time. I characterize this overall two-direction process as reflexive
in using the meaning of reflexivity as where something acts upon itself.
We might say that all individual interactive systems display this reflexive dynamic in some
degree, but in many cases the feedback from shared circumstances to one-by-one
interaction does not significantly modify that interaction. For example, while markets
evolve, particular markets also often show relative stability and maintain a given form over
time. Whether a system exhibits a changing dynamic then depends in part on how we
judge the importance of the relevant feedback effects and how the functioning of the
1

One example he used was that of how the heating system of a building combines room heating and overall building
temperatures (Simon, 1962, 474). As one referee points out, there is a large literature in social psychology and
sociology on how behavior is more than the sum of individual behavior. As summarizing this would raise many
additional issues, this paper limits it attention to the bare-bones Simon general model.
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system as a whole appears to us to be altered. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, that
judgment is based on significantly higher levels of morbidity and mortality and on
worsened economic well-being in both individual and economy-wide ways.
Stephen Davies (2020) shows how pandemics are different from more common localized
epidemics, and describes this difference in terms of three phases pandemics go through.
First there is the spreading phase, historically often along trading routes, second, a
‘smouldering’ phase when local outbreaks begin to interact and build upon one another. A
third phase is when there is an accelerating spread of a disease with a wider and more
uniform dispersal across different areas. Following this progression, a disease may decline
or instead go through additional waves depending on how natural forces and social
intervention proceed.
A natural type of escape from its continuation is where herd immunity develops when “the
number of susceptible people in a given population is at a level where one case will give
rise to fewer than one new case, because of the physical difficulty of finding a vulnerable
person” (Davies, 133). In economics and marketing science, models of innovation replicate
this pattern when a rise in a given population of ‘adopters’ of something new is followed by
fall in remaining possible ‘adopters’ as there are fewer and fewer possible ‘adopters’ left out
of a given a population. When this latter number falls to a low level, the innovation is
standardized and ceases to be an ‘innovation’ (Rogers, 1962; 2003). Similarly, when few
there are few people remaining who have not been infected by a disease, herd immunity is
achieved, and the disease ceases to have pandemic status. Frank Bass formalized and
generalized Rogers’ model in developing the widely employed Bass innovation diffusion
curve (Bass, 1969).
In the case of public health, however, attaining herd immunity usually does not come about
simply in this natural sort of way since societies typically intervene in pandemics through
public health measures meant to alter the course of a disease. How populations respond
to these measures removes the more deterministic sort of pathway many innovations
follow, as we have seen in the case of COVID-19 in terms of the different ways in which
people have responded to public health measures. Here, then, innovation modelling is
limited in what it can tell us since it is only framed in terms of the changing proportion of
adopters to non-adopters.
Innovation modeling also misses something else that people’s response to public health
measures may bring about – something we seem to have seen in the case of COVID-19 –
namely, that the social uptake of public health measures can change people’s beliefs
regarding the efficacy of experts’ special knowledge, affecting their power and ability to
influence public health. That is, innovation modeling also needs a micro level analysis that
acts together with and can modify its macro level adjustment process. In reflexivity terms,
there are circumstances in which shared judgements across a population regarding public
health recommendations feed back and act on how people interact on a one-by-one basis,
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and that can change individual behavior at the interaction level for better or for worse. I
describe this uptake mechanism in terms of the self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism.

4. Self-fulfilling prophecies
A classic modern example of a self-fulfilling prophecy is Robert Merton’s bank run (Merton,
1948). An expert publishes a report saying a bank is insolvent though that is in fact false.
Nonetheless, depositors hear of the report, trust the expert’s knowledge, withdraw their
funds from the bank, the bank then fails, and it becomes true that the bank is insolvent.
What occurs can be called a belief reversal and a consequent change in what is taken to be
true (Davis, 2020b). In terms of the two-direction, two-level feedback loop system above,
when the expert expresses an opinion – a type of external shock – the one-by-one
interaction between the bank and depositors tips into a bank run, this signals that the bank
may fail, this feeds back on remaining depositors causing them to also with draw their
funds, and the bank indeed fails. At that point the contagion in Merton’s example comes
to an end, though if one bank’s failure creates doubts about other banks, then a run on
many banks is possible.
This spreading of a contagion across banks in fact is what happened in the 2007/2008
financial crisis. In the early years of the decade, banks developed a new basis for mortgage
finance in the form of mortgage-backed securities that they constructed and sold to various
investors. They were successful in this practice for a number of years, and thus, at least for
a time, they were solvent. However, financial experts began to criticize this system as
unstable, and some traders began to short mortgage-backed securities. Lehman Brothers
was the first bank to be subject to close scrutiny, and the first to suffer a stop in its external
funding and a breakdown in its one-by-one bank-funders relation. This changed not only
the bank’s status but also signaled that all banks involved in mortgage-backed finance were
at risk. Thus funding for many of them was withdrawn as well, the contagion spread, and
virtually the entire U.S. banking system would have become insolvent had there not been
the government rescue plan that began with Bear Stearns.
What Merton and the financial crisis demonstrate, then, that in a two-level feedback loop
system experts’ opinions can take on wider significance, and influence the entire set of
interactions between individuals that ordinarily proceed in a largely self-contained way.
This same dynamic, then, has occurred in the case of COVID-19. Health systems, like
banking systems, are built around sets of one-by-one interactions between people in need
of health care and health care providers. Yet in the extreme circumstances of a pandemic
expert opinion may emerge from many sources, and should one set of experts’ opinions
gain particular influence, they may act as self-fulfilling prophecies changing the system in
place meant to deal with disease transmission.
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Suppose, then, that the system in place at a given time involves good disease management
(testing, mask wearing, hand washing, social distancing, contact tracing, etc.), but doubts
expressed about it cause people to distrust its recommendations, change their practices,
and the effect of this is to worsen how well the disease is managed based on those strategies.
Then what was true, that the system worked effectively, becomes false because it no longer
succeeds in managing the disease – another case of a belief reversal and change in what is
true. The worsening of the disease then has the potential to erode trust in the overall health
system much in the way the financial crisis the funding stop banks suffered threatened
belief in their solvency. In effect, the public health system is bankrupted, and rather than
halting disease transmission we see additional waves of infections.
That in two-level reflexive feedback systems these sorts of outcomes can occur reflects a
further dimension expert opinion possesses. Expert opinion depends on mastery of
specialized knowledge which I noted above is always fallible. Koppl thus recommends we
be aware of the risk of expert failure and that experts may make mistakes. They themselves
should be humble about their abilities. Yet at the same time because expert knowledge is
specialized, non-experts are not in a position to judge when experts are mistaken, even if,
as Koppl recommends, people are skeptical about expert knowledge. This thus becomes
an especially serious problem in the extreme circumstances of a contagion that works
society-wide. Then the need to judge expert opinion increases without commensurate
increases in our abilities to judge it. That is, the knowledge-trust gap increases according
to the greater importance of that knowledge.
Broadly, we can imagine two kinds of reactions that can result: the opinions of some experts
may be exaggerated and the opinions of others may be disregarded. The exaggerated
opinions people act upon function as self-fulfilling prophecies in that increasing belief in
them works to confirm those opinions. These opinions then crowd out other expert
opinions that are accordingly disregarded.
Koppl’s expert failure problem is consequently not just an individual problem but also a
social problem. Indeed, experts may admirably manage the individual virtues and vices
their special positions involve, but still find themselves, perhaps surprisingly even to
themselves, the authors of self-fulfilling prophecies that may due much damage. (A famous
example is J. Robert Oppenheimer, known as ‘father of the atomic bomb,’ who later in life
deeply regretted his role in developing the bomb). This complicates a normative
interpretation of the expert problem when framed primarily in individual terms. How,
then, might we need to expand our normative perspective to address this?
Prior to turning to this issue, the next section turns to what expert knowledge is said to
produce, namely, public goods. The problem here is that when people’s ability to judge
expert opinion is limited, and it is difficult to determine whether one expert’s opinion is
superior to another’s, people may choose to follow different experts. This can then lead to
multiple competing experts who produce multiple competing public goods. How can there
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be multiple competing public goods if public goods are generally non-excludable and nonrivalrous? Consider, then, economics’ standard goods taxonomy.

5. The political economy of economics’ goods taxonomy
The concept of a public good in economics is a technical term with a specific meaning. In
the standard taxonomy of goods, goods are classified according to the degree to which they
possess two characteristics: excludability and rivalrousness (Musgrave, 1959). For contrast,
first consider the more familiar category of private goods, the opposite of public goods.
The excludability characteristic refers to the degree to which access to their use can be
limited to some individuals. Thus, ownership of a private residence gives owners of that
residence the ability to determine who makes use of it, so excludability is high. The
rivalrousness characteristic refers to the degree to which a good’s use can be shared by
different individuals if they have access to it. For example, food can only be used by single
individuals because its consumption uses it up, so rivalrousness is high.
A public good, consequently, is defined as a good that possesses low degrees of
excludability and rivalrousness. Public playgrounds are generally open to and can be used
by many people at the same time, so both excludability and rivalrousness are low. Whereas
private goods are secured by private property laws, public goods are usually provided by
governments. Considerable attention in political economy, then, is traditionally directed
at the relationship between public goods and private goods, since they are directly opposed
types of goods with quite different means of provision that take both excludability and
rivalrousness to extremes.
Yet recently scholars have argued that this traditional focus and emphasis on the privatepublic goods dichotomy neglects how the nature of goods is often institutionally
contingent (Furton and Martin, 2019; Rayamajhee and Paniagua, 2020; Geloso and Candela,
2019). One way to reflect this while retaining the standard goods taxonomy is to note that
in addition to these polar opposite cases there are also two mixed cases in the standard
goods taxonomy in which one characteristic operates to a high degree and the other to a
low degree. These two mixed cases are also polar opposites, but instead emphasize
institutional settings.
James Buchanan recognized one of these two cases in arguing that there exist goods that
exhibit high degrees of excludability, just like private goods, but also low degrees of
rivalrousness, just like public goods, when those goods are provided to only certain groups
of people. He labeled these goods ‘club’ goods, because they are easily associated with clubs
of all kinds (Buchanan, 1965; cf. Marciano, 2021), and they are now also referred to as local
public goods. Examples of clubs, then, are common. Membership entitles one to the use
of whatever facilities the club offers, as in a sports club. Examples of local public goods are
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what city and local governments provide only to residents, such as schools, parks,
community centers, etc.
Opposite to this case, Elinor Ostrom focused on the type of goods that exhibit low degrees
of excludability and high degrees of rivalrousness (Ostrom, 1990), and also exhibit
considerable institutional specificity (Aligica, 2014; Rayamajhee and Paniagua, 2020).
These are common pool resource type goods to which everyone has full access and where
people’s use of those resources ultimately depletes them – a tragedy of the commons type
situation (Hardin, 1968). Examples are natural resources like fisheries, shared animal
grazing lands, and the atmosphere itself. Non-natural examples are urban environment
amenities and the internet which open access can potentially destroy.
The full taxonomy of goods economists employ, then, is represented in the Table 1 below,
which is useful in allowing us to compare two contrasting axes: the private goods-public
goods axis on the northwest-southeast diagonal, and the club goods-common pool goods
axis on the southwest-north east diagonal.

Table 1: Standard taxonomy of goods

Goods characteristics

Excludable

Non-Excludable

Rivalrous

Private goods

Common pool goods

Non-rivalrous

Club/local public goods

Public goods

The paired types of goods on the two different axes, then, function as opposites of one
another for different political economic reasons. The private goods-public goods axis – the
more familiar opposition – is based on the differences and tensions between individuals’
independent, free activity and government direction and control of that activity. The
club/local public goods-common pool goods axis – the less familiar opposition – is based
on the capacity of some groups to exclude certain economic and social activities from other
groups versus a space in which exclusionary practices generally do not exist and a kind of
Hobbesian war of all against all prevails.
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The two pairs of opposed goods also differ in another important respect. Whereas in the
private goods-public goods case there is considerable debate over where the boundary
between the two should fall, there is little doubt that both types of good provision will
continue to exist. Neither Ayn Rand nor Karl Marx will likely carry the day. However, in
the case of the club/local public goods-common pool goods opposition it seems unclear
how sustainable a world is in which some enjoy the security of excluding others and others
with no such protections are constantly at risk of surviving.
Ostrom’s strategy was to introduce political governance strategies for commons types of
circumstances whereby people might secure more stable livelihoods. Local political
organization and cooperative relationships would work much like more formal
governmental institutions though in a bottom-up rather than top-down way. However, the
world we live in does not seem to be following Ostrom’s pathway very well since commonstype settings continue to characterize the lives of many people. Thus, it remains unclear
how sustainable the world is when shock events such as the pandemic test societies’
cohesiveness.

6. Different uptakes of expert opinion in the case of COVID-19 in the U.S.
With this in mind, let us return to the pandemic as it has affected the U.S., and ask what
the club/local public goods-common pool goods opposition could imply about the
evolution of public opinion. In this sort of situation, particularly when people are under
great pressure to determine what expert knowledge is reliable without much to guide their
thinking, there can be a tendency to exaggerate some experts’ opinions and disregard those
of others. Koppl’s analysis of experts additionally tells us that people may identify as
‘expert’ individuals who lack actual expertise but are perceived to know who is expert. In
effect, influential figures, such as national government leaders, especially in times of crisis,
may then function as ‘experts’ or as surrogates for experts. Thus, if actual experts because
their knowledge is highly specialized carry relatively little influence, influential
government leaders may do so in their place and also influence the interpretation of their
expertise. Moreover, political leaders not in power may also be influential, and this can
then work to produce multiple, competing ‘expert’ opinions.
To take the simplest case, one that corresponds to the club/local public goods-common
pool goods opposition, imagine that there exist two main types of responses to ‘expert’
opinions for the U.S. experience over 2020 and 2021. One rationale for the two-response
case is that public opinion on many issues in the U.S., is quite polarized reflecting the
dynamics of its two-party political system. A further rationale of a more political economic
nature is that the pandemic has had disproportionately severe effects some social groups
and relatively modest effects on others according to their social-economic status. An
important difference between these two social groups, then, is whether individuals have
been able to work remotely from the relatively safety of home. Thus, modeling responses
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to ‘expert’ opinions in terms of two main types of responses is meant to capture this socialeconomic difference, using the club/local public goods-common pool goods opposition as
a structural foundation.2
It should also be noted that the idea that responses to ‘expert’ opinions coalesce around
any main sets of opinions depends on assuming that the uptake on opinion works like a
self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism. Yet there also exist an opposite type of mechanism,
namely, a self-defeating or self-negating type of prophecy mechanism, whereby ‘expert’
opinion is explicitly rejected rather than amplified.3 Whether, then, the uptake on expert
opinion in any given case takes the form of a self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecy
depends on the historical circumstances and we can often only say, after the fact, which
occurred. In the case of the pandemic in the U.S., then, at least until the 2020 national
election, people’s responses to the pandemic did appeared to polarize around two main
views – a pair of self-fulfilling prophecies regarding which ‘expert’ opinions should be
followed that tended to compete with one another.4
Let me, then, be more specific about which ‘experts’ were seen as influential.
Accompanying this difference regarding whether people could work remotely is the
difference between whether people have reasonably good health insurance or not. Thus,
people unable to work remotely often also have poor health insurance, if any; people able
to work remotely often have decent employer-based health insurance. This generalization
obviously does not hold in all instances, but nonetheless represents large numbers of
people. If, consequently, we pair these two cases with the club/local public goods-common
pool goods opposition, having an employer-based health insurance fits the first
circumstance because that insurance works like a private, excludable good, while having
little if any health insurance fits the second circumstance in which all compete for little
health protection.
Whose opinions, then, would each such group of people be likely to take most seriously –
or exaggerate when taking the form of self-fulfilling prophecies? What is missing from the
idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy purely as a mechanism is how an opinion becomes socially
authoritative. I suggested above that authority resides first in those regarded as ‘experts’
because they are socially influential. Yet for an opinion to to become a self-reinforcing
2

These clarifications regarding the motivations behind this two response model were stimulated by the helpful
comments at the conference of David Harper.
3
This point was made at the conference by Mario Rizzo. The response to the Y2K problem, where computers were
all expected to crash at the beginning of the year 2000 is a famous example. Experts advanced an opinion but this
caused people to act so as to prevent the problem.
4
Another refinement on this analysis was suggested at the conference by Roger Congleton. Using the cognitive
dissonance idea and Bayesian updating, he pointed out that people may hold opinions with wider variance when they
encounter contrary evidence. In effect, self-fulfilling prophecies may be fragile, and despite appearances be subject
to unexpected reversal. I put aside this refinement here. Relatedly, Luc Marest has argued that in dynamic social
economic environments – the 2007/2008 financial crisis is his example – disequilibrium rather than equilibrium may
be the better way to characterize the world. This is consistent with Congleton’s refinement, and a further way of
thinking about the instability of self-fulfilling prophecies.
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process of collective belief formation, Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein argue that something
also needs to trigger a chain reaction that increases its plausibility in public discourse
(Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). They explain this through informational and reputational
cascades, two species of availability cascades, a well-documented cognitive heuristic.
Informational cascades occur where people have incomplete personal information, and
“base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others” (Ibid., 686). Reputational cascades
are motivated by social approval or disapproval, and people “take to speaking and acting as
if they share … what they view as the dominant belief” (Ibid., 686-7). In addition, Kuran
and Sunstein argue there exist local informational and local reputational cascades which
operate in ‘subcommunities’ or parts of larger communities. I apply this analysis, then, to
how two sets of social beliefs regarding the pandemic developed into self-fulfilling
prophecies.
First, consider groups with employer-based health insurance which functions as an
excludable provision of a club or local public health good. Their experts are individuals
who administer employer-based insurance plans because they can say what people’s health
care coverage is, but their ‘experts’ are individuals who contribute to the interpretation of
those administrators’ explanations, ranging from colleagues, friends, to important
community and political leaders. Table 2 identifies only the primary actual experts whose
opinions are amplified by others who give their opinions authority.5
To the extent, then, that people with this insurance come to believe they are likely to be
protected against the disease by their insurance coverage, they are likely to take these
expert and ‘expert’ opinions as sufficient for pandemic-related health needs. They are then
less likely to place much weight on the expert opinions of public health officials who
prioritize the benefits of public health strategies (masking, distancing, etc.). The favored
experts’ opinions then can work like self-fulfilling prophecies, and crowd out disfavored
opinions.
Second, consider now people in the common pool situation. In these circumstances in the
U.S. private health insurance is generally unavailable since their earnings rarely include
non-wage benefits. They also are likely to live, commute, and work in congested social
settings where it is difficult to isolate oneself from others, while often living paycheck to
paycheck making employment necessary. The opinions, then, of the experts these
individuals are primarily likely to exaggerate are government officials and business leaders
who emphasize the need to keep the economy going. The supporting opinions of ‘experts’
that may be influential are those of national political leaders concerned about the
economic costs of shutdowns. These opinions are also likely to disregard public health
officials who recommend such strategies as social distancing and shutdowns. This advice
might make sense but is simply seen as impractical. Thus, here also people fit their
behavior to a particular set of opinions that can also work like self-fulfilling prophecies.
5

I put aside here whether ‘experts’ distort expert opinions.
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Table 2 summarizes these two pairs of responses for these two groups according to whether
people occupy club-local public good or common pool type situations. They are framed in
terms of the primary expert opinions amplified by ‘expert’ opinions.

Table 2: Responses to experts

Goods type situation

Opinions amplified

Opinions disregarded

Club/local public

Private insurance plan
administrators

Public health officials

Common pool

Government officials and
business leaders

Public health officials

In both cases, the influence of people’s favored opinions operates on the one-by-one
individual interaction level. Yet when these opinions, as Kuran and Sunstein explain,
become collective beliefs, this feeds back upon people’s behavior, tends to confirm people’s
individual beliefs, and those opinions acquire the status of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Overall, the two sets of opinions that get adopted in both case crowd out public health
expert opinions so that the landscape of opinions is characterized by the opposition
between those two sets of opinions.
Yet both sets of opinions work against reducing disease transmission. The public health
opinions that might affect disease transmission are formulated in terms of how pandemics
operate across populations rather than in the one-by-one terms. However, both sets of
opinions above get formulated as individual beliefs as if no process of collective belief
formation has occurred. In both cases, the experts people exaggerate produce opinions
that work on the individual interaction level and concern goods specific to groups of
individuals. The experts people disregard produce opinions cast at the social level in terms
of how entire health systems work, and are not in formulated in terms of group-specific
goods. What seems called for, consequently, is that we move beyond the goods framework
for thinking about health (cf. Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Rayamajhee and Paniagua, 2021),
and instead directly address how individuals in different communities may address how a
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society can manage society-wide health problems. That is, what seems called for is a public
choice approach to the problem. To explain this it seems we need to think about the
processes on which they depend, or on the nature of public reasoning.

7. Public choice and public reasoning
Public choice is the economic investigation of political behavior. Its emphasis is on
economics as political economy and the intersection between economics and political
science. Constitutional political economy, as a specific approach to public choice theory
developed especially by James Buchanan (see 1986), adopts a liberal social contract theory
perspective in which emphasis rests on the rules and institutions that societies build into
their political processes.
The central question … is how to guarantee that rules and institutions reflect the
shared interests of its constituents and respect their autonomy, i.e., remain neutral
vis-a-vis the plurality of citizens’ conceptions of the good (Colin-Jaeger, Dold and
Gascoin, 2020, 2).
In principle, what will “guarantee that rules and institutions reflect the shared interests of
its constituents and respect their autonomy” is that they are seen as just and legitimate
because they have been established by some process of agreement. Yet what does
agreement involve between people who may have very different concepts of what is good?
When people are solely motivated by their individual interests, it is difficult to see how
they can reach agreements regarding a society’s rules and institutions. Thus, rather than
focus on reconciling people’s different interests, the task of establishing agreements
regarding a society’s rules and institutions should be conceptualized as a matter of
establishing reasons for them (Korsgaard, 1996; Colin-Jaeger, Dold and Gascoin, 2020).
Reasons, in principle, are accessible and intelligible to all individuals whatever their
interests and whether or not they agree with them. Reasons, potentially, transcend
conflicts of interest. Thus, establishing shared rules and institutions in a liberal, open
society arguably depends on the ability of people to exchange and debate reasons for
adopting any given set of rules and institutions to which they agree.
We can characterize a debate over reasons, then, as a process of public reasoning and
deliberation, and ask ourselves under what conditions might it succeed in generating rules
and institutions that are generally taken to be just and legitimate. I frame this as a matter
of what the ‘success conditions’ are for an open society to function as seen from a liberal
social contract theory perspective. If people disagree over particular outcomes which a
public reasoning process produces, at least they may be hoped to agree on broad conditions
needed for that process to operate, on the assumption that those conditions are seem to be
just and legitimate.
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One proposal in this regard comes from Jürgen Habermas whose discourse approach to
ethics and politics broadly describes two main ‘success conditions’ an exchange and debate
over reasons depends upon: a deliberative process seen as just and legitimate must be both
inclusive and noncoercive (Habermas, 1996; see Bohman and Rehg, 2017). As has been
pointed out (for example Sunstein, 2006), Habermas’ discourse approach, as well as those
generally that emphasize how social deliberation underlies democracy, is highly idealized,
and real world democratic systems are subject to a variety of constraints and problems,
such as group think, preference falsification, etc.6 However, idealized conceptions also
have strong normative value in that, from a constitutional perspective they create
standards to be pursued in open, democratic societies.
To interpret, then, what this idea of what successful exchange and debate over reasons
involves, particularly when some people occupy club goods type locations and others
occupy common pool goods type locations, I ask what these two ‘success conditions’
require if people are to overcome their differences and engage in a successful public
reasoning process seen as just and legitimate. Table 3 takes Habermas’ two conditions,
distinguishes micro and macro levels to which they respectively apply, as operate in the
two-level, two-direction reflexive system conception described above, and then identifies
the particular normative targets needed in each case. These two normative targets specify
broadly when a public reasoning process succeeds in being inclusive and noncoercive.
Though they operate on two different levels, they should be seen as reinforcing each other.
When individual-to-individual interaction is noncoercive and people do not stigmatize
each other, a society builds inclusiveness. When a society builds inclusiveness, people do
not stigmatize each other.
Table 3: Legitimate and just public reasoning

Habermas condition

Level where applies

Type of process

Normative target

non-coerciveness

Micro

one-by-one

stigmatization

inclusiveness

macro

shared experience

exclusion

6

This point was emphasized by Mark Pennington. Roger Koppl has added that Frank Knight thought deliberative
democracy both the best political system and one fundamentally problematic at the same time.
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Stigmatization generally works through social group identities – race, gender, religion,
disability, etc. (Davis, 2015). Its effect is to place individuals stigmatized at a disadvantage
in public reasoning processes such that their thinking, in their own view, does not carry
the same weight as those of others not stigmatized. Social exclusion generally works
through how entire societies are organized in terms of social group differences in
opportunities and economic and well-being outcomes. What social exclusion does in
public reasoning processes is remove some groups of people from participation such that
their thinking lacks a voice.
Regarding COVID-19, then, and the division in the U.S. over expert/’expert’ opinions
regarding strategies to address it, consider how stigmatization and social exclusion act on
public reasoning. Public reasoning is often associated with governmental bodies such as
legislatures in which there is explicit exchange of views, but in open societies with active
media of different kinds, educational institutions at different levels, community
organizations including churches, civic groups, and neighbors and friends getting together,
there also exists public reasoning which reflects and acts upon more the more formal type
of reasoning we see in governmental bodies. In all venues, then, to the extent that some
people’s views are stigmatized and excluded, whether they be from advantaged or
disadvantaged social groups, public reasoning and deliberation over response to the disease
fails to take place. What could allow it to go forward is that debates over expert opinion
differences are kept open to people’s different interests and views.
People of course may debate when and whether these success conditions for an open public
reasoning process hold. My emphasis on normative targets is based on the idea that it is
easier to say when these conditions fail than to say when they hold – an idea associated
with Karl Popper’s falsification thinking (Popper, 1959). People are generally quick to see
when their voice and interest is manipulated or denied. Thus, if we are from a public choice
perspective to defend the idea of a liberal free society, what seems needed is that at all
levels where public reasoning occurs we attend to what may cause it to fail.
Recall here Koppl’s expert paradox, which derives from uncertainty and human fallibility.7
The same, then, needs to be said about public reasoning. If there is no ‘royal road’ to what
it successfully decides, its viability depends upon it being sustained, just as we will always
need to rely on expertise. Thus, if there exist general conditions we ought to observe when
we judge it, seeing public reasoning as successful also can be seen to depend on general
conditions. From a constitutional political economy perspective and the goal of
maintaining an open, liberal society, I suggest this calls for defending non-coerciveness and
inclusiveness in public reasoning irrespective of people’s social locations.

7

As he reminded us in the conference, we are ultimately still a kind of animal.
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8. The normative scope of expertise as applies to public health
Koppl’s expert problem emphasizes experts’ virtues and vices. In light of their relative
mastery of specialized knowledge in societies with developed divisions of labor, a burden
falls primarily on individuals to find a balance between what they ought and ought not do.
However, the normative scope of the expert problem is larger because apart from what
experts do people in society also bear responsibility for how they use and misuse expert
knowledge. That others are the users rather than the creators of expert knowledge still
carries responsibilities. In effect, users of expert knowledge function as ‘experts’ at a
remove since the authority they may lend to experts’ opinions when they are difficult for
people to judge gives those opinions authority they might not otherwise possess.
In large complex societies this can be understood in terms of the two-level, two-direction
reflexive feedback systems that allows us to describe contagions whether of the health kind
or cultural and political kinds. Experts’ opinions initially operate on the individual level,
but as they become collectively influential or not according to how others exaggerate or
disregard them. When we factor in the phenomenon of a self-fulfilling prophecy and
information and reputation cascades, and recognize that societies may find themselves torn
between multiple experts and strategies for combatting social shocks such as pandemics,
entire societies may find themselves seriously at risk for making those problems worse.
Thus, the normative challenges societies face operate on a large scale, and may well be
more difficult to address than a virtue ethics approach suggests. At the same time, the
normative challenges societies face in circumstances such as pandemics are not
independent of political challenges they produce. A public reasoning process, then, is not
just a management of people’s different interests but also a normative deliberation in which
people judge what people’s responsibilities are and how to balance these with overall social
risks.
Table 3 is intended to provide one framework in which this wider structure of normative
challenges might respond to not just an experts’ division of labor but also social divisions
of labor that contemporary societies possess. The normative targets there are pragmatic in
nature. Their purpose as success conditions whose possible failure is their focus is to put
up guard rails that might make public reasoning and deliberation between people with
different interests and views possible, especially in conditions under which differences
between people’s circumstances may be significant.
Beyond pragmatism, we might ask for a deeper normative rationale for this liberal view of
deliberation and public reasoning, one which expresses some conception of social good
that a viable public reasoning process seeks. One of the most powerful, I suggest, is the
one advanced by Avishai Margalit in his ‘decent society’ conception. He defines a decent
society as one whose rules and institutions do not humiliate its members and undermine

18

individual dignity (Margalit, 1996). Margalit does not fill in the content of the social good
but leaves it open. What the good or goods of a society are ultimately depends on the
people who live in it, and no doubt change over time. In this regard, Margalit’s ideal also
expresses what a liberal conception of society involves, balancing freedom and individual
dignity. Thus, if a viable public reasoning process is pragmatically a means to this
normative end, we might also say this sustaining that end is also the means to people being
able to engage in that process.
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